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DISPUTED (DISCIPLINARY) BOUNDARIES:
PHILOSOPHY, ECONOMICS
AND VALUE JUDGMENTS
Paolo Silvestri*
Department of  Economics and Statistics «Cognetti de Martiis»
University of  Turin
This paper aims to address the following two questions: a) what is the logic of the
kind of discourse that seeks to found, demarcate or defend the autonomy or the
boundaries of a discipline; b) why does this discourse, whether methodological, on-
tological or epistemological, sometimes turn into normative, dogmatic-excommuni-
cating wrangles among disciplines, schools or scholars? I will argue that an adequate
answer may be found if we understand: 1) disciplines as institutions and, therefore,
as dogmatic systems, where scholars’ discourse often takes the form of a legitimizing
discourse regarding the founding Reference of their own discipline; 2) that scholars
speak in the name of that very foundation, with which they closely identify; 3) that
the issue of the legitimacy of a discipline cannot easily be separated from the issue of
identity and, therefore, of a scholar’s legitimacy; 4) that the excommunication may
arise not only when the founding Reference is absolutized, but also as a form of self-
defense of a scholar’s identity-legitimacy. To understand these claims I will re-exam-
ine three paradigmatic positions: the methodological, ontological and epistemolog-
ical considerations put forward by (and the debates between) Pareto, Croce and
Einaudi – with specific reference to the demarcation between philosophy, economics
and value-judgments.
* Address for correspondence: paolo.silvestri@unito.it.
Previous versions and separate parts of (or research for) this paper were presented at: the
Research Center on the History and Methodology of Economics «Claudio Napoleoni»
 (cesmep), Department of Economics and Statistics «Cognetti de Martiis», University of Turin;
Centre Walras-Pareto d’études interdisciplinaires de la pensée économique et politique (cwp),
University of Lausanne; Cornell Law School, Cornell University; Storep Conference (Univer-
sity of Torino, 2015). I sincerely wish to thank the Directors of the abovementioned
Centres -Roberto Marchionatti (cesmep) and Roberto Baranzini (cwp) – and Annalise Riles
(the Academic host during my visiting to the Cornell Law School) for having invited me, as
well as all the participants and discussants for their helpful comments that have helped me to
improve this paper. Last but not least, I owe a special thanks to the anonymous reviewers: their
critical comments made this a much better paper.
This paper is a re-thinking and a further development of the major philosophical and
methodological issues I have addressed in analysing some suppressed interdisciplinary debates
that took place in Italy in the first half of the twentieth Century: Silvestri 2008, 2010a, 2010b;
Fossati, Silvestri 2013, and above all, with regard to the Croce-Pareto debate: Silvestri
2012b, 55-95. This research also led me to the discovery of an unpublished rewriting by Einaudi
(2017). Paragraphs 2 and 3.1 of this paper are a summary and a re-elaboration of Silvestri 2010a
and 2012b, 55-95.
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1. Introduction
he present paper aims to address the following two questions: first-
ly, what is the logic of the kind of discourse that seeks to found, de-
marcate or defend the autonomy or the boundaries of a discipline, and
secondly, why does this discourse, whether methodological, ontologi-
cal or epistemological, sometimes turn into normative, dogmatic-ex-
communicating wrangles among disciplines, schools or scholars? I will
argue that an adequate answer may be found if we understand: 1) disci-
plines as institutions and, therefore, as dogmatic systems, where schol-
ars’ discourse often takes the form of a legitimizing discourse regarding
the founding Reference of their own discipline; 2) that scholars speak in
the name of that very foundation, with which they closely identify; 3)
that the issue of the legitimacy of a discipline cannot easily be separated
from the issue of identity and, therefore, of the legitimacy of the given
scholar; 4) that excommunication may arise not only when the found-
ing Reference is absolutized, but also as a form of self-defense of the
scholar’s identity-legitimacy. To understand these claims I will re-ex-
amine three paradigmatic positions: the methodological, ontological
and epistemological considerations put forward by (and the debates be-
tween) Pareto, Croce and Einaudi – with specific reference to the de-
marcation between philosophy, economics and value-judgments.
The scholars’ respective positions and debates will be analyzed by fo-
cusing on what can be regarded as a problem faced, implicitly or explic-
itly, by all three of the above-mentioned figures. It is a problem of ‘de-
marcation’, albeit approached from different perspectives, depending
on the scholar in question. Furthermore, it is often developed with op-
posite outcomes. Thus the following distinctions can be recognized: the
demarcation between Philosophy and Economics – mainly in Croce’s
perspective –, (economic) Science and pseudo-sciences – mainly in
Pareto’s perspective –, and economic science and value-judgments –
mainly in Einaudi’s perspective.
Here I am using the expression «demarcation problem» in a broad
meaning, without any pretence to solve such a problem (as is known,
such a problem is far from being settled). But I am mainly interested in
understanding why scholars’ discourse on the demarcation criteria turn
out to be machines de guerre, as claimed by Laudan (1983, 119): «no one
can look at the history of debates between scientists and ‘pseudo-scien-
tists’ without realizing that demarcation criteria are used as machines de
guerre in a polemical battle between rival camps».
In my view, the reason why scholars’ discourses on the demarcation
issue turn out to be machines de guerre is due to another latent (and not
always explicit) issue. It stems from the issue of the legitimacy of the
T
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 discipline and, therefore, of the legitimacy of a scholar working in that
discipline.
Emblematic, in this regard, is the debate on «Economics in (the) cri-
sis», to paraphrase the title of an article by Krugman (2012), where the
issue of the «failure of economics» is associated with the issue of the
«failures of the economics profession». The crisis of economics turns
out to be a crisis of legitimacy both of the discipline and of its scholars.
Even more emblematic is the fact that some of these debates were ap-
parently concerned with the demarcation problem, where the issue at
stake was explicitly stated in terms of whether economics «is» or «is not»
a «science» (Shiller 2012; Chetty 2013; Wang 2013; Rosenberg, Curtain
2013; Krugman 2013a). These debates did not attempt an in-depth anal-
ysis of the demarcation problem as occurred, for example, in the engag-
ing post-Popperian debates aiming at introducing a solid demarcation
criterion in Economics.1 Rather, as noticed, they were concerned with
an issue of credibility:
it seems as though economics is fighting for its right to stay in the exclusive group of
fields deemed worthy enough to be called “science” … Nevertheless, the underlying
implication behind this battle is that to be a ‘science’ is to be credible.
(Wang 2013)
In other words, if a discipline is labelled as pseudo-science, its scholars
are likely to be regarded as charlatans.
Many of the terms used in these battles reveal this issue of credibility
and legitimacy. I will quote just a few of the disputes. For example, Rodrik
(2009) attempts to defend economics and suggests that one should
«blame the economists, not economics», thus implying that economics is
merely instrumental, while «economists – and those who listen to them
– became over-confident in their preferred models of the  moment…
Hubris creates blind spots. If anything needs fixing, it is the sociology of
the profession». In sum, economists behaved like «ideologues». Schiller
(2012) upholds the scientificity of Economics against Taleb’s (2004, 115)
 accusations of «charlatanism», «scientism» and «pseudo-scientism».2
Krugman (2013b), in his concluding remarks, concedes that «maybe
 economics is a science, but many economists are not scientists […] all too
many economists treat their field as a form of theology».
Naturally, a «sociology of the profession»,3 as claimed by Rodrik,
may help us to understand what went wrong with the economics
1 On this see, at least, Blaug 1980, Caldwell 1982, Boland 1989, Hausman 1988 and the
other essays in de Marchi 1988, 1992.
2 «[In] economics … you can disguise charlatanism under the weight of equations and no-
body can catch you since there is no such thing as a controlled experiment» (Taleb 2004, 115).
3 See, for example, Fourcade 2009, and Hirschman and Popp Berman 2014.
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 profession. Nevertheless we should, first of all, notice that these de-
bates – with specific reference to their way of posing the ‘demarcation
issue’ and the implicit issue of the legitimacy of economics (and
economists) – are far from new. Many years ago, in an article titled The
Legitimacy of  Economics, Boulding noted that «the problem of legitima-
cy has been surprisingly neglected by social scientists, and especially by
economists». He was referring, specifically, to the «problem of the le-
gitimacy of economics as a science or a discipline, and the legitimacy
of economics as a profession» (Boulding 1967, 299, 302). To my knowl-
edge, this article was the only attempt to explain and address such a
problem by resorting to the language and categories of the legitimacy
of legal, political and even religious institutions. Secondly, these de-
bates are not at all new if it is true that the accusations of the «failure
of economic science» (Einaudi 2017, 45) – and the implicit issue of legit-
imacy of economics (and economists) – dates back (at least) to the first
world war. This was an epoch in which Italian Economics «was second
to none» (Schumpeter 1954, 855)1 and even the philosopher Benedetto
Croce was regarded by Schumpeter as standing among the great
economists of that era.
Perhaps, if we want to understand the abovementioned «over confi-
dence» in models, «hubris» or economist’s «theology»,2 we can learn
something from the methodological, epistemological, ontological and
interdisciplinary debates of that period. These debates not only were
‘second to none’, but also have the advantage (from the point of view
of this paper) of resorting to the language of legitimacy borrowed from
legal and political disciplines, as in the case of Einaudi’s (legal) dogmat-
ics of Economics.
The paper pursues a twofold aim. Firstly, it is written as an essay in
the history of philosophical and economic ideas, with the aim of
 casting new light on these debates among Italian scholars and inquir-
ing into their relevance. Secondly, but no less importantly, it repre-
sents an  attempt to re-read them by focusing not so much on their
contents as, rather, on the structure, purposes and effects of these de-
bates in their attempt to found, demarcate and/or defend the bound-
ary of a discipline.
I will begin by providing the reader with the interpretive frame-
work and the keywords through which I will try to re-read the earlier
scholars’ work and reinterpret their approach. The interpretive frame-
work is based on the analogy between institutions and disciplines con-
1 On this see Marchionatti et al. 2013.
2 The idea that economics has become the new «theology» is far from new; see, for exam-
ple, Nelson 1991 and the further discussion by Boettke et al. 2006.
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sidered as dogmatics, and the logic of scholars’ (self )legitimizing dis-
course. The keywords are: dogmatics, dogma and founding Refer-
ence; identity and legitimacy; mistaking of fiction for reality; excom-
munication (sec. 2).
After this initial overview, I will focus on the main methodological
issues of the Croce-Pareto debate (sec. 3), with specific reference to
the  reflection on the «principle» or foundation of economic science.
The paper will examine the reciprocal accusations of introducing
«metaphysical» assumptions and the crucial issue of nominalism versus
realism, on the threshold of which the debate came to a halt (sec. 3. 1).
I will then assess Croce’s attempt to go beyond this dichotomy – by
 introducing the distinction between Science and Philosophy, pseudo-
concept and pure concept, fiction and reality – and show how this
 resulted in the definitive interruption of the communication routes
 between Economics and Philosophy (sec. 3. 2), economists and
philosophers.
I will then clarify that this debate can be interpreted in terms of a (sec.
4) clash between (different) modes of discourse on (the same) fictional
foundation. That is to say, it was a clash between Croce’s «Economic
principle» (sec. 4. 1), and Pareto’s «Pure Economics» (sec. 4. 2). I will ex-
plain why both such approaches bring about, contrary to the intentions
of their authors, a kind of inversion where fiction is mistaken for «real-
ity», and name for «things» (sec. 5).
In section 6 I will dwell on Einaudi’s reflection concerning the dis-
tinction between the «economist qua economist» and the economist as
a «whole man». I will demonstrate that this distinction can be inter-
preted as an attempt to go beyond the abovementioned demarcations
between Philosophy and Economics, and Economic science and val-
ue-judgments. The key to such an interpretation lies in explicitly ad-
mitting the discursive (and, therefore, always ambiguous) nature not
only of Economics or Philosophy but also of the very discourse on
method.
Section 7 concludes with brief comments on the identity of disciplines
and scholars (qua scholars).
2. An Interpretive Framework:
Institutions and Disciplines as Dogmatics,
and the Scholar’s (Self)Legitimizing Discourse
To begin with, let me introduce the interpretive framework and the
keywords through which I will attempt to answer the leading issues of
this paper and re-read the methodological statements by Croce, Pareto
and Einaudi.
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I am referring here to the possibility, sketched elsewhere,1 of under-
standing institutions as disciplines and disciplines as institutions in terms of
dogmatics (or also: dogmatic structures or dogmatic systems). This is
possible because both are, at one and the same time, not only instituted
but also instituting processes. Accordingly, they claim a form of legiti-
macy and credibility through a specific kind of discourse on the founda-
tion, as put forward by its interpreters or scholars.2 This often reveals
that the issue of the legitimacy of a form of knowledge or of a discipline
also implies, at least to some extent, an issue of the legitimacy of its
scholar (or community of scholars). Therefore, the issue also involves
the identity of the scholar qua scholar.
For the present purposes it will be sufficient to recall the analogy I
 established between Einaudi’s two concepts of «dogma» and Pierre
 Legendre’s «dogmatic anthropology».
The first concept of dogma used by Einaudi arose from a critical re-
assessment of the tradition of European and Italian legal-political
thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Dogmas –
such as legal-political formulas, myths, oaths, images, rituals, ceremo-
nials, symbols etc. – are considered as the ultimate foundation of the le-
gitimacy of juridical-political institutions and the source of normativity.
A common example is the dogma of Sovereignty, an enduring con-
struct of legal dogmatics (Einaudi [1918] 1920). Einaudi’s later reflection
on «juridical-political dogmas» aimed to reinterpret them as forces of
social cohesion, «affective states of mind» (or the unconscious or affec-
tive side of institutions) that constitute «the basis of legitimacy» (Einau-
di 2001 [1946]). However, he believed that this should not imply relegat-
ing them, in the name of a claimed superiority of scientific rationality,
to the sphere of the irrational (as claimed in Mosca and Pareto’s theories
of the élites).3
The second notion of dogma was taken over by the Einaudi-Michels
debate On the method of  writing the history of  economic dogma. Einaudi
adopted the technical concept of legal dogmatics in order to specify the
epistemological sense of the abstract and ideal-typical constructs of
 Economic science:
1 In particular in Silvestri 2010, 2012b, starting from the two notions of dogma used by
Einaudi, I reinterpreted and compared them with the positions of different scholars such as
Legendre 2000, 2001, 2006; Di Robilant 1974; Heritier 2007; Ricoeur 1975; Borutti 1999.
2 This perspective can also be paralleled to Economics as discourse: see, at least,
 McCloskey 1985; Samuels 1990; Backhouse, Dudley-Evans and Henderson 1993.
 Nevertheless, the perspective outlined here, which stresses the analogy between institutions
and forms of knowledge, aims to highlight the normative implications and effects of these
 varieties of disciplinary discourse.
3 On this point see Silvestri 2012a; Silvestri and Forte 2013.
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I use the word «dogma» deliberately in order to tease those who, whenever they hear
the word «dogma», immediately imagine that the subject being dealt with is a
 ‘revealed’ truth, assumed as an act of faith. Thus they presume that economists are
some sort of believers in a Word, who are determined to impose it on others with
the fire and sword of intellectual excommunication for the heretics … Dogma has
nothing to do with all this; and it’s high time the meaning of this word should be
 reinterpreted. We need to admit, as has long been done quite uncontroversially by
scholars of law, that it means the logical framework on the basis of which the
 concepts used by economists in their attempt to build up a science are provisionally
and successively set in a specific order.
(Einaudi 1932, 214)1
By presenting Economics as a purely «logical», neutral (or value-free or
ideology-free) construct made up of «concepts» Einaudi was deliberate-
ly trying to excommunicate from the kingdom of Economics a particular
kind of heretics (or to keep such individuals outside its boundaries). He
was referring both to the scholars who were depicting Economics (and
economists) as ideologically biased or rooted in some kind of ideology,
and also to the corporatist economists who aimed to bend Economics
to fascist ideology.
Moreover, Michels (1932, 303-313) did not fail to notice the «seductive»
and intrinsically ambiguous nature of dogma, which can result in mistak-
ing the fiction for reality. A «dogma» may, over time, undergo a transfor-
mation into something that is removed from the realm of «doubt»,
 removed from «being perfected or subjected to criticism», thereby be-
coming a «scourge of truth».2
The attention drawn to Einaudi’s two notions of dogma is of consid-
erable importance here. Firstly, because we will return to Einaudi’s
methodological discourse (sec. 6), but secondly, also because his great-
ness as a man and economist is to be found in his ability to cross disci-
plinary boundaries. In particular, he concerned himself, at one and the
same time, with Moral philosophy, History and Economics (Forte,
Marchionatti 2012, 620), but also with legal and political thought, well
aware that such boundaries are merely conventional, and therefore in-
stituted by a specific discourse.
1 On Einaudi’s «history of economic dogma’ see also Barucci 1974, who, nevertheless,
 notices neither the twofold side of the Einaudian notion of dogma (legal-political and episte-
mological), nor the relevance of its derivation from legal-dogmatics. Such an analogy between
legal-dogmatics, with specific reference to the concept of State and ideal-types, is likewise
 implied by Weber (2003 [1904], 60, n. 25, 71-72) but for different purposes (Mardellat 2009,
614-620), and also alluded to by Schumpeter (1914) in the title of his Epochen der dogmen und
Methodengeschichte.
2 «Who can possibly fail to notice the extent to which the fixed and definitive model the dis-
ciples and the epigones of the master firmly believe they possess entices them into slotting
whatever historical or economic phenomenon they happen come across into ready-made
stereotyped categories?» (Michels 1932, 303-313).
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The two sides of dogma, present in Einaudian writings, can be re-
 interpreted through the perspective of «dogmatic anthropology»
 developed by the historian of law Pierre Legendre (2000, 2005, 2006).1
In such a perspective the human being is a homo simbolicus or a symbol-
ic-metaphysical animal, caught in the web of institutions. In this sense,
institutions have the anthropological function of instituting us as ratio-
nal beings by forging a connection between our biological and symbolic
dimensions.
Here «institutions» should be taken in their anthropologically more
authentic meaning of instituting, in the strict sense of instituere [estab-
lishing (statuere) inside (in-)] but also of founding and educating. This
implies that we can understand legal-political-economic institutions
and also forms of knowledge and sciences as instituted and instituting,
working in the same way as language (Ricoeur 1975).
Legendre’s «dogmatic anthropology» and the distinction between
dogma and dogmatics (or dogmatic system) can then be explained as
follows. «A dogmatic system is a system of interpretations» and it is
 «defined socially as a multi-plane organization of loci of interpreters».
Dogma itself can be defined in several ways: as the locus of the Founda-
tion or founding Reference, or as the locus of the fictional Thirdness or
Impartiality, the Mirror, or of that which is foundational, which is usu-
ally constituted through a mise-en-scène (of legitimacy). In other words,
it is that Reference in the name of which its interpreters make assertions,
whether these interpreters be popes, emperors, men holding power in
government, scholars of law, economists or scientists (Legendre 2006,
70, 353, 344). Their assertions are made according to the specific histori-
cal Reference (or References) dominating in a certain society or epoch
(God, Sovereign, The People, State, Science, Reason etc.). The histori-
cal Reference in question does not necessarily follow the path of secu-
larization: sometimes it takes the form of a replacement of  an authority
with another authority. In Legendre’s words:
all the political habitats of mankind rest on the same base: the mise-en-scène of the
Social Third, or otherwise stated, of a mythic founding entity, having the status of
the founding Image, capable of producing … the institutional power of attraction.
The two complementary sides of this power of attraction can easily be recognized
everywhere: on the one hand the power to arouse political love, on the other the
power to produce the legal effect [or normativity of the law].
(Legendre 2000, 212-213)
1 Partial translations and excerpts of Legendre’s works are now in Legendre 1997. I also
re-read Legendre’s dogmatic anthropology through the re-interpretation made by Heritier
(2007, 2013a, 2013b, 2014) in terms of «anthropology of freedom» and «legal aesthetics», and Su-
piot’s (2006) Homo juridicus. For an application of Legendre’s dogmatic anthropology to the
institution of money as the product of a specific fictio iuris see Amato 2010 and Fantacci 2005.
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Entering into a sphere of knowledge, an institution, a culture, a text or
a given historical version of the Reference (Myth, Religion, Science etc.)
thus implies entering into this mise-en-scène. ‘Entering / having entered
into’ always presupposes a creed, a faith. «Any form of knowledge, in-
cluding that of a scientific nature, is founded on a prior discourse by
means of which that given body of knowledge is instituted and is believed
by men to be true» (Heritier 2007, 189).
As the ultimate foundation of a dogmatics, the dogma is, in short, the
place of our founding beliefs, namely the beliefs of the individual, of so-
ciety, but also of the branches of knowledge. It is not the antithesis of
reason, an incontrovertible truth or an absolute principle, but the locus
on which human reason is founded and which, precisely for this reason,
is removed (temporarily) from the sphere of critical discussion.
An important aspect of the founding Reference is that its «certainty»
is not open to discussion. Rather, it holds in a «this is the way it is»: in
other words its fictional, discursive or even aesthetic nature is held as if
it were true and real. Note that dogmatics or a dogmatic system does not
(necessarily) imply a form of dogmatism. Admittedly, dogmatism may
(always) be its end result, depending on our relation with the above-
stated founding beliefs. But the relation itself is an identity relationship,
which, in turn, may range from a form of dogmatism or idolatry to
complete detachment or even abandonment.
In this broader perspective, institutions (as disciplines) and disciplines
(as institutions) act as mirrors of individual and collective identity.1 They
are endowed with a normative structure that is far more profoundly
rooted in complex and ambivalent feelings than in instrumental or sci-
entific rationality.
To explain this point, without resorting to the Lacanian background
of Legendre and his device of the Mirror, let us take the common claim
according to which scientists are depicted as passionless or detached,
entertaining no emotional relation with the knowledge, models or ob-
ject of their own research.2 Scholars may be completely detached from
and indifferent to models they deploy in their research, but they cannot
completely avoid being personally involved in their own discipline and
1 For an analysis of the relation between disciplines and identity in academic discourses see
Hyland 2012.
2 See, for example, Mirrlees (1973, xxi): «one should not fully believe in models – one can
use a model without being committed to it […] for workers in the scientific tradition it makes
sense to entertain a model and use it without being committed to it; while the scientist cannot
imagine why mere models should be the object of passion. I think that, in this, the scientists
are right». Indeed, if the scientist’s passionless behaviour were so obvious, there would be no
need to re-assert it, as Mirrlees does.
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profession as a whole (in Weberian terms it is the scientist’s Beruf or vo-
cation). This personal involvement is particularly evident, as we will see
later, when scholars feel the need to defend their own discipline or even
their own stance or argument, against an attack or critique launched by
another scholar or by the lay public. For it is only persons that may need
to be defended, not disciplines, which are not persons. If scholars were
completely indifferent or neutral to their discipline, there would be no
need to defend it. By defending their own discipline, scholars are defend-
ing themselves.
Therefore, the logic of excommunication may arise not only when
the founding Reference is absolutized, i.e. when the scholar loses the
distinction between fiction and «reality» (which is a specific kind of idol-
atry), but also as a form of self-defense. The latter comes into play when
the identity-legitimacy of the scholar is threatened by an attack on (or
delegitimation of) the founding Reference; for example, when one
claims that economics is not a science.
Let us now take a look at how this framework, and, in particular its
keywords – dogmatics, dogma and founding Reference; identity and le-
gitimacy; mistaking of fiction for reality; excommunication – can help
us to re-read the ontological, methodological or epistemological reflec-
tions of Croce, Pareto and Einaudi.
3. The Main Issues
of the Croce-Pareto Debate
The debate between Croce and Pareto, sparked by the discussion on the
«economic principle» (Croce 1953 [1900], 1953 [1901]; Pareto 1953 [1900],
1953 [1901]), constituted a veritable watershed in the history and
methodology of economic thought and social sciences in Italy. This
would later be recalled by Einaudi (1955 [1950]) in an essay conceived as
a sort of final balance of the history of Italian economic thought.
Starting out from the acquisitions of the Methodenstreit, thus from the
victory of the ‘abstract’ over the ‘historical’, the debate arose initially as
an examination of the «economic principle». The two contestants ad-
dressed some of the foundations of economic science: the problem of
value, the theory of action and choice, the use of mathematics in eco-
nomics, the nature of foundational hypotheses. Nevertheless, the most
tricky methodological question, which severely curtailed the Croce-
Pareto debate and resulted in the sharpest disputes, was the opposition
between realism and nominalism.1 I will now outline its major aspects.
1 On the Croce-Pareto debate, with specific reference to the fundamental issue of realism
versus nominalism analysed here, there is a substantial lack of international literature. Among
the Italian contributions see Busino 1975 [1973], Bruni 2002 (Ch. 3), Faucci 2014, 130-151. I have
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3. 1. Realism and Nominalism
Croce’s attempt to found the «Economic principle» as an autonomous
basis for any study of the economic action1 reached a first fundamental
conclusion through a process of purification of human action from any
moral consideration:2
in the concrete every action (volition) of man is either moral or immoral, since no
actions are morally indifferent. But both the moral and the immoral are economic
actions; which means that the economic action, taken per se, is neither moral nor im-
moral. Strength of character, for example, is found both in the honest man and in the
cheat … this then [is the definition of Economic] which I should like to see at the be-
ginning of every economic treatise: the data of economics are the practical
activities of man in so far as they are considered per se, independent of
any moral or immoral determination.
(Croce 1953 [1900], 178 (capital letters in the text))
In his first reply, On the economic phenomenon, Pareto accepted this defi-
nition but pointed out that such a definition arose from a «partition of
the concrete fact». This partition was obtained through a process of iso-
lation and abstraction, which implied «cutting a slice» of a concrete phe-
nomenon. It was the same procedure that Pareto intended to follow in
the construction of «Pure Economics» (Pareto 1953 [1900], 180).
Nevertheless, Pareto did not fail to notice a small difference between
his approach and that of Croce. Although it was a difference that now
may seem little more than a simple «misunderstanding», it was later to
prove crucial:
provided an extensive analysis of this issue in Silvestri 2012b, from which this paragraph 2 is
mainly drawn.
Naturally, the Croce-Pareto debate on realism and nominalism could be re-read (with
 regard to its limits) through the epistemological lens of the new realism (in science, philosophy
and economics). As to «critical realism» in Economics see Lawson 1994, 1997, 2003 and the
 subsequent scholarly debates; among the latter, see the articles collected in Fleetwood 1999
and Fullbrook 2009. For a different perspective on realism, anti-realism and «realisticness»
see Mäki 1998, 2000, 2012. Nevertheless, it is worth repeating that my aim is to understand the
logic of the methodological discourse set out by Croce and Pareto in their attempts to  establish
the boundaries between Economic (Science) and Philosophy.
1 For a recent reappraisal of Croce’s economic thought see Cutrona 1998 and Monte-
sano 2003, Faucci 2003, Bodei 2003.
2 Gramsci noticed the similarity between Croce’s action philosophy and Robbins’ (1932)
 action theory with regard to the «rational nexus between means and ends» (Gramsci 1991, 339).
On this see also Cutrona 1998. There is a misunderstanding of the idealistic immanentism of
Croce’s «philosophy of the practical» where the end is not external to the action, as in Robbins’
action theory and as had already emerged in Croce’s critique of Pareto’s choice theory, but is
immanent to action.
In my view the analogy between Croce and Robbins (and in this respect also between them
and Pareto) is true only as to their respective attempts to found the so called autonomy of the
Economic (Croce) or Economics (Robbins) so as to free it from any moral, political or ideolog-
ical consideration.
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my words purport only to show where I make that arbitrary cut and you consider
them as if they had the purpose of investigating what the economic phenomenon is.
Now I do not believe that there is objectively an economic phenomenon and there-
fore it seems a waste of time to investigate what it may be.
(Pareto 1953 [1900], 194)
Croce, in the second and following letter, soon noticed that their «dis-
agreement» had «two chief sources»: a «disagreement on a question of
method and a disagreement on a question of postulates [presupposti]»
(Croce 1953 [1901], 197).
On the issue of method, Croce wrote:
you [Pareto] talk of cutting away a slice from a concrete phenomenon, and examin-
ing this by itself; but I enquire how you manage to cut away that slice? … your cut-
ting-off of the slice is indeed an answer to the problem of the quid in which an eco-
nomic fact consists. You assume the existence of a test to distinguish what you take
for the subject of your exposition from what you leave aside. But the test or guiding
concept must be supplied by the very nature of the thing in question, and must be in
conformity with it.
(Croce 1953 [1901], 197)
On the issue of presuppositions, Croce accused Pareto of trying to found
economic science by introducing an implicit «metaphysical» presuppo-
sition which held that «the facts of man’s activity are of the same nature
as physical facts» (Croce 1953 [1901], 198).
Well before the beginning of the debate with Pareto, Croce was mov-
ing within the great methodological divide of his time: human sciences
versus natural sciences. He feared that the inclusion of human action
within the framework of natural sciences, in which Pareto himself was
trying to set up Economics, would reduce the human person to an au-
tomaton and human freedom to deterministic or mechanistic concep-
tions.
Pareto, for his part, returned the charge to its sender. He made it clear
that their divergences concerning the manner of establishing the auton-
omy, boundaries or «limits of a science» were to be «traced back to that
famous [medieval] clash between the nominalists and the realists».
I am the most nominalist of nominalists. For me the only objective cases are concrete
cases. Their classifications are man-made and are, therefore, arbitrary, unless we es-
tablish – always arbitrarily – the ends of a classification. In this case the latter can be
deduced logically from those ends […]. No science has ever been able to give a pre-
cise definition (as you would say a definition issuing “from the very nature of the
thing”) … (a nature which I, as an empirical nominalist, admit I do not know).
(Pareto 1953 [1901], 203)
Pareto’s contention was that while Croce’s quest for the «economic
principle» was a search for the essence or «nature» of economic facts, eco-
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nomic science starts out from merely fictional «hypotheses», or «As If»
hypotheses. This was the case, for example, of Newton’s hypothesis of
universal gravitation (Pareto 1953 [1901], 205).
However, there was one question that was still open and which, in
the course of their discussions, remained unresolved. It was the issue of
the link between hypotheses and «reality», together with the related is-
sue of how the reality of empirical facts should be construed. This ques-
tion was all the more pressing as both Croce and Pareto claimed to con-
cern themselves only with facts, especially since the hypotheses
continued to refer to this reality. Did they have in mind the reality that
belongs merely to the empirical sphere or was the Real taken as founded
and true reality?
After Pareto’s second and last article, the debate between the philoso-
pher and the economist seemed to be closed forever.
Croce took Pareto’s accusations of metaphysical realism seriously.
The issue of nominalism versus realism became the subject of his subse-
quent research on Logic. Comparing his own positions with the episte-
mology of empiricocriticism, pragmatism and conventionalism (Mach,
Poincarè, Avenarius, Rickert, Bergson, Le Roy), Croce developed the
theory of pseudo-concepts and of their non cognitive but, rather, practical-
economic character. In Croce’s philosophy, «pseudo-concepts» or «fic-
tional concepts» are the abstractions of science and social sciences:
schemata, laws, models, ideal-types, constructs. They work as names,
étiquettes and symbols: having the function not of acquiring knowledge
but of creating an order in the world for practical and operative purpos-
es. However, in developing the theory of fictional concepts he was ef-
fectively seeking to go beyond the opposition between nominalism and
realism. Hence the fundamental issue raised by Croce was the follow-
ing: empiricism and the «theorists of fictions» overlooked the need to
answer the question of «whether their theory of concepts as fictions
might not itself be a fiction» (Croce 1964 [1907], 11). Empiricism, Croce
pointed out, was not capable of giving an account of itself. And every
time it attempted to do so, or tried to justify itself, it fell back into a foun-
dationalist line of reasoning, thereby bringing about, often uncon-
sciously, a sort of self-transcendence of the empirical. The contingent
thereby becomes transformed into the necessary, the empirical into the
absolute. In contrast, what Croce was endeavoring to achieve was to
give an account of fiction and of the name, while avoiding the conse-
quence of making the name coincide with truth. In other words, he
sought to avoid asserting that very truth which traditional nominalism
was continuing, despite everything, to ‘preach’: the universal is the
name, nominalism claimed, but the essence of the name was neverthe-
less predicated in the name of that which is true. Nominalism and real-
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ism remained two metaphysical systems, inverted and in a relation of
reciprocal exclusion.
The crucial point of Croce’s argument resided in his aim of avoiding
any form of hypostatization or entification of the empirical. In order for
the empirical to continue to be coherent with itself, it must continue to
be empirical. And this meant, as Croce constantly repeated, that one
must not mistake one thing for another: the name must not be confused
with that which is true, the contingent with the necessary, fiction with
reality. These are the pairs that define the Crocean macro-distinction
between Science and Philosophy.
From this line of argument there follows the fundamental distinc-
tion between pseudo-concept and pure concept. The pseudo-concept
is not truth but imitation of the truth or concept. The doctrine of
the pure concept is, for Croce, realism; in the sense that it is founded
(= true) reality. But it is a doctrine that does not deny nominalism,
inasmuch as the name, the fiction, the étiquettes and the symboles, be-
long – precisely because they are useful – to the category of the Useful
and not to that of the True. In other words, they belong to two of the
four categories of the Philosophy of  the Spirit, corresponding to Eco-
nomics and Logic.
3. 2. Philosophy and Economic Science
Croce put forward these positions in an article, Economia filosofica ed
economia naturalistica [Philosophic economics and naturalistic economics]
(Croce 1906),1 devoted to a critical examination of Pareto’s (1906)
 Manual.2 He subsequently systematized them in Logica [Logic] (Croce
1907) and in Filosofia della pratica. Economia ed etica [The Philosophy of
the Practical. Economics and Ethics] (Croce 1909), by means of the dis-
tinction between Philosophy and Economic Science.
1 For the sake of clarity, it is worth noting that Croce’s «philosophy of the economic» only
partially coincides with the current Philosophy of Economics, not only because of the Crocean
separation between Philosophy and Economics. Take, for example, the standard tripartitions
of the current Philosophy of Economics, in terms of 1) Action theory, 2) Ethics (or normative
social and political philosophy), 3) Philosophy of science (Hausman 2013); a slightly different tri-
partition can also be taken into consideration: 1) Political economy as political philosophy, 2)
the methodology and epistemology of economics, 3) Social ontology and the ontology of eco-
nomics (Davis, Marciano, Runde 2004). On the issue of ‘new directions’ in Philosophy of
Economics see: Ross, Kincaid 2009 and Binder, Heilmann, Vromen 2015. We can see that
Croce’s category of the Useful is the category of economic action (or, rather, «economic voli-
tion») and, at the same time and not without unresolved ambiguities, the category aimed at ex-
plaining the useful nature of abstractions and representations made by sciences as well as by lan-
guage. In any case, Croce’s category of Useful has nothing to do with Ethics or normative
considerations, or with ontology, as the Real (or, rather, history) was the subject of Philosophy.
2 On the epistemological genesis of Pareto’s Manual see Mornati 2006.
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In Economia filosofica ed economia naturalistica Croce expressed appre-
ciation of two aspects: namely, the gradual liberation of economic stud-
ies from the «burden of all the questions of a practical or political char-
acter», and the resulting «theoretical or scientific» character of economic
science. Croce praised Pareto for his ability to keep science and social
programs distinct; he also approved of Pareto’s
firm but equally righteous proposal to repress and regulate his own feelings as a com-
bative writer on political affairs, sacrificing sentiment to the severity of science every
time that a scientific, and not political, inspiration lay at the root of his hypothesis.
(Croce 1961 [1906], 265)
At the same time, however, Croce criticized Pareto for the first two
chapters of the Manual that contained a «bad philosophy» and a form of
empiricism that was dogmatic and at times naïve (ibidem, 267).
In Croce’s view, Philosophy and Economic Science can be distin-
guished on the basis of the «different manner of treatment» (ibidem,
266), with regard, respectively, to the True and the Useful. The schema-
ta, laws and models of economic science are of the pseudo-conceptual
order and can thus be regarded as having the function not of acquiring
knowledge but of creating an order in the world for practical and oper-
ative purposes.
While one may state that Economics [i.e. economic science] does not give either the
universal truth of Philosophy or the particular truth of History, it is nevertheless the
case that Philosophy and History, for their part, are unable to carry out the smallest
calculation. While Economics has no eye for the truth, Philosophy and History have
no weapons to smash and dominate the surging wave of facts … And we see now in
Economics a tendency, which cannot but be sound, to constitute itself as pure Eco-
nomics, that is to say, free from practical questions, the latter likewise being historical
questions.
(Croce 1945 [1909], 256)
And as he added a few pages later:
accordingly, as far as concerns the interaction between the Philosophy of Economics,
delineated above, and Economic Science or Calculation, whose nature we have de-
fined, there is no disagreement. Nor can there be a disagreement between two for-
mations that are altogether heterogeneous, one of which moves within the cate-
gories of truth, while the other operates outside of these, guided by intentions of a
practical order.
(Ibidem, 261)
Although there is an evident contradiction in depicting Economic Sci-
ence as «free from practical questions» and, at the same time, «guided
by intentions of a practical order», the distinction between Philosophy
and Economic Science would eventually be fixed by Croce in a negative
perspective as well. Thus Croce would criticize the «confusions be-
tween economic science and the philosophy of economics», and the
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«mistakes deriving therefrom». The three most common errors spring-
ing from this confusion were, he argued:
1) Ending up by «denying philosophy for economics». This, he claimed,
was the approach adopted by economists who «mock» philosophy as
«empty prattle» and who
1) even seek to destroy and replace the methods of empirical observation and of
mathematical construction, and who, as they attempt to carry out this deed, go
so far as to parade (however much they may protest the contrary) a particular
and poorly self-aware empiricist and mathematical philosophy of theirs.
1) Croce famously demolished these economists with the verdict or in-
junction, which sounded like an excommunication: «save yourselves
the trouble of philosophizing. Calculate and don’t bother to think!»
and, at the same time, by admonishing philosophers with an equal
and opposite injunction;
2) Awarding «universal value to empirical concepts», such as the inter-
pretations of «liberism» that elevate such concepts to a «law of na-
ture», or interpretations that hypostatize «historical and contingent
facts»;
3) Transforming «the fictions of calculation into reality» (ibidem, 262-
265).
Now, it is precisely the abovementioned (1) injunction or excommuni-
cation by Croce that is conventionally held, in Italy, to mark the break-
down of the communication routes between philosophy on the one
hand, and economics (and social sciences) on the other, and, at the same
time, between philosophers and economists.
The crucial question then became: what is the foundation of that in-
junction? Or, rather, in the name of what does such an injunction estab-
lish a boundary between philosophy and economics, which, in turn, es-
tablishes a reciprocal exclusion between philosophers and economists?
4. The Clash Between (Different) Modes
of Discourse on (the Same) Fictional Foundation
I would now like to show how and why, against the background of the
introductory framework, and beyond the huge differences between
Pareto and Croce, they were actually carrying out the same discourse on
the principle. In fact, their debate can also be read as a fight for the legit-
imacy of their respective founding References (Philosophy and Economic
Science). However, while Pareto’s principle could be founded only
through a fictional hypothesis, Croce continued to believe that the eco-
nomic principle was viable in its own right and per se.
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4. 1. Croce’s Foundation of  «Economic Principle»
Let us now return to the moment when Croce founded what he believed
to constitute the Economic. Would this attempt at foundation succeed?
Let us consider again Croce’s definition of the «economic principle»: «in
the concrete every action (volition) of man is either moral or immoral,
since no actions are morally indifferent. But both the moral and the im-
moral are economic actions; which means that the economic action, tak-
en per se, is neither moral nor immoral». Therefore, economic action
must be considered «as a practical action, because it is, by abstraction,
emptied of all moral or immoral contents». Hence the definition of Eco-
nomic which, Croce suggested, ought to stand at the head of every eco-
nomic treatise: «the data of economics are the practical activi-
ties of man insofar as they are considered per se, independent
of any moral or immoral determination» (Croce 1953 [1900], 178).
These passages conceal one of the persistent ambiguities of Croce’s
Economic, encapsulated in the polarity expressed by the two phrases
«in concrete» and «taken per se». On the one hand, «in the concrete every
action (volition) of man is either moral or immoral, since no actions are
morally indifferent», and therefore the economic action cannot but be,
in the concrete, moral. However, the distinction between the Econom-
ic and morality is thereby lost. If, on the other hand, economic action is
considered in the sense of «taken per se», then the Economic is inevitably
abstract. But in such a case, Croce would be unable to account for an ab-
stract conceived in this manner. The difficulty would arise in particular
if, in opposition to any intellectualism or abstract rationalism, he were
to try to establish the Reality of the Spirit as part of the category of the
Economic, since the latter, considered as an abstract, would turn out to
be a pseudo-concept. This would imply acknowledging that the entire
Spirit is a pseudo-concept, an abstraction or a fiction (taken in the neg-
ative sense attributed to fictions by Croce himself: see below).
Moreover, one might even ask whether Croce genuinely succeeded
in construing an Economic in the «abstract» or «taken per se». The ab-
stract, if it is abstract, is abstractus [drawn away] from something else,
and therefore it stands in relation with this ‘else’. Thus to the extent that
the abstract implies such a relation, it cannot even be considered, to use
Croce’s phrase, as a «taken per se», i.e. construing the per se in the man-
ner of a pure identity. Indeed, if the per se is a pure identity, a pure unre-
lated, it is such only in words and through words (and thus through Croce’s
words). A pure unrelated does not exist. As soon as we think of an ob-
ject, we immediately set it in connection with itself – as demonstrated
by the per [for] of the ‘per se’ – and with the thought that has thought it
(Visentin 2005, 71). The claim of founding the auto-nomy of the category
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of Utile [Economic], or even the auto-nomy of a discipline, is, at least in
this sense, a claim doomed to fail.
To return to the issue of the fictional foundation of Croce’s discourse,
we should now ask why Croce, upon founding the Economic, stated he
would like to see that definition standing at the very «head of the Trea-
tises of Economics». Note that the head of the Treatises, that is, the prin-
ciple of treatment, is itself a metaphor that speaks of the beginning. Fur-
thermore, it cannot avoid the task of introducing the reader into the
treatment or the Treatise. And we also note the fictional, aesthetic or
rhetorical-communicative strategy inherent in the use of capital letters
to emphasize precisely that principle or beginning.
The issue is as follows: who has the right to talk about or, rather, in
the name of that principle? To understand this point, let us take a fresh
look at the Crocean distinction between Philosophy and Economics.
Apparently, Croce’s goal was to reach a truce in the methodological
conflict with Pareto and, in general, over the disputed boundary be-
tween philosophy and science. He thus stated that philosophical eco-
nomics and naturalistic economics, «although armed against each other,
will not have to go to war against each other, inasmuch as it suffices for each of
them to jealously watch their borders» (Croce 1961 [1906], 267 (italics mine)).
But the truce was only apparent. For as Croce added, «Pareto falls in-
to the error – which is common to all naturalists and phenomenists and
mathematicians – of denying the right of  that [philosophical] treatment».
Moreover, such thinkers contradict themselves because, «after exclud-
ing philosophy from their purposes, they introduce – now stealthily,
now violently – a bad philosophy», as often happens in the introductory
chapters or «prefaces» of their «treatises» (here Croce is referring to the
first two chapters of Pareto’s Manual) (ibidem, italics mine).
In other words, Croce advances a demand for a mutual «vigilance»
between Philosophy and Economics, taken as if they were of equal
rank. But then another issue arises: is this demand really nothing but the
claim of a ‘right’ to a different «way of treatment» (of the same subject)?
Or, rather, does this demand hide Croce’s attempt to claim a higher
point of view, that of Philosophy, in terms of a claim of the principle of
(economic) principle(s), namely, of that principle which he would like to
see at the «head» of economic treatises?
If this is true, it is nothing more than a classic attempt to replace one
authority with another authority: the substitution of Philosophy for Sci-
ence. But if this is once again true, then the charges that Croce addresses
to Pareto backfire. In this sense their debate is based on a substantial and
mutual lack of understanding of their struggle in the quest for the legit-
imacy of a founding reference – «Philosophy» versus «Science» – each
supposedly, or rather, fictionally or discursively placed higher than, and
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as such exclusionary of the other, or higher than that of the other knowl-
edge or discipline.
4. 2. Pareto’s Foundation of  «Pure Economics»
Even Pareto pursued an attempt to «institute» a «new theory» on a more
rigorous and scientific basis than had been attempted previously,1 as he
wrote in his first letter to Croce (Pareto 1953 [1900]). Such an attempt
implied founding the autonomy of Economic science by cutting the
umbilical cord that still bound Political Economy to the «metaphysics»
of «natural law».
The criticism that Pareto addressed to the Walras (1896) of Études d’é-
conomie sociale2 is emblematic, since it was itself a maneuver of replace-
ment of one authority with another authority. This was an approach
that was avowedly «scientific», although Pareto was nevertheless un-
able to avoid the confession of being a «believer»:
professor Walras thinks it possible to draw certain economic conclusions from meta-
physical principles of jurisprudence. This opinion is worthy of respect but I am un-
able to accept it. I am a believer in the efficiency of experimental methods to the ex-
clusion of all others. For me there exist no valuable demonstrations except those that
are based on facts.
(Pareto 1897, 491)
Once again, the crucial question is to understand the foundation of that
«exclusion of all other [methods]». It is worth recalling Pareto’s (1917)
Discorso per il Giubileo, in which he reaffirms his reference to the model of
the natural sciences, and, especially, to the experimental method. Here
he states his intent to banish from the social sciences sentimental and
metaphysical considerations.
To gain further insight into the foundation of that «exclusion», ban-
ishment or excommunication, careful attention should be devoted to a
comment by Bobbio on Pareto’s Discorso, weighing almost each word:
throughout his life the image of  himself that Pareto liked to convey was that of a man
who dispassionately lambasted all the human passions that had hindered the path of
society’s scientific knowledge; a man who voiced his disbelief of all the most absurd
beliefs that had fuelled social metaphysics (which many had seized for themselves and
passed off as science); a discerning, always clear-thinking, impassive observer of
the recurrent and – execrated though it was – constantly resurgent human folly. One
of his favorite antitheses was that between the dogmatism of all faiths and “scientific
 skepticism”.
(Bobbio 1973, 6 (italics mine))
1 On Pareto’s early development of pure Economics see Marchionatti, Mornati 2000;
Baranzini, Bridel 1997.
2 On the methodological differences between Pareto and Walras see Marchionatti,
Gambino 1997 and Marchionatti 2000.
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However, it is not so much a question of noting the contradiction, albeit
fairly marked, inherent in Pareto the sociologist, as for instance was un-
derlined by Raymond Aron, who regarded the thousands of pages
penned by the Lausanne professor as «laden with passion and value
judgments» (Aron 1981 [1967], 428). Much less will we aim to argue,
along with the Schumpeter of the Epochen der Dogmen, that one should
cast doubt on the «correctness of the professiones fidei in a scientific trea-
tise» (Schumpeter 1953, 275). For while the latter warning referred to
Marshall’s «preachings», a not dissimilar problem also arose for Pareto’s
sociology, which «is not, like his economic theory, a first-class technical
performance; it is something quite different. It is an attempt to preach
a homily» (ibidem, 310).
In effect, by continuing to reason along these lines based on opposi-
tions, despite the above noted contradictions, the approach still
 remains within the epistemological-anthropological antithesis of
modernity. This is testified by the Paretian statements, namely:
 Science, Reason, Experience versus faiths, religions, dogmatism, theol-
ogy, ideology, metaphysical investigations, irrationalism, passions,
sentiments, emotions, value judgments, etc. Such an antithesis, in turn,
is also reflected in Pareto’s action theory through the logical/non-
 logical categories.1
In contrast, what eludes the Paretian manner of thinking is that sci-
ence itself, as noted earlier by Weber, is founded on a Beruf, a vocation,
a passion, a faith (Weber 1946 [1919]). In effect, although «“an atheist of
all religions”, according to his own definition of himself, by making this
declaration … Pareto was actually making his profession of faith» (Bob-
bio 1973, 6). So much so that, Bobbio concluded, according to Pareto
the path of science would be open only to someone who was prepared to recognize
no other authority than that of reason and experience, and who would be willing, in
the name of  this authority, to continually call into question his own discoveries.
(Bobbio 1973, 6 (italics mine))
Accordingly, it is possible to call into question one’s own discoveries,
but not to call into question or criticize the Authority of Science. In oth-
er words, Science had become Pareto’s religion: the Authority in the name
of  which he spoke. Thus Pareto was reproducing the mechanism of re-
placing one authority by another, perpetuating a device that was no less
dogmatic (in the Paretian negative sense) or censorious than that which
he was criticizing.
1 On the structural analogy between Pareto’s demarcation Science/metaphysics (or pseu-
do-science) and logical/non-logical categories see Albert 2004.
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Pursuing the implications of Bobbio’s comment somewhat further,
and taking another look at his incipit, one might even seek to determine
the source (the mirror) of Pareto’s image of himself as «one who dispas-
sionately lambasted all the human passions». And, above all, why did he
have such a liking for this ‘image’?
It was precisely the discourse on method, with reference to «objective»
and «dispassionate» knowledge, that instituted in the Pareto-scientist the
tension between Reason and passions, to the point of leading him to be-
lieve that he «dispassionately lambasted all the human passions». This was
the proud image of himself that he liked to put on display. Nevertheless,
though, not without contradiction, Pareto was a «believer» in Science.
He loved Science as much as he loved passionately that image of him-
self which Science reflected to him, and which (perhaps) gave meaning
to his action in the public sphere as an economic Scientist. With (and
through) this image Pareto presented, represented, identified and recog-
nized himself.
5. On the Mistaking of Fiction for «Reality»,
of Name for «Thing»
We can now return, on the one hand, to Croce’s concern that arose
from mistaking fictions for reality, and we can seek to understand the
reasons for this concern. On the other hand, however, we may also ex-
amine a reflection by Pareto on names and things, where he seems to
take his nominalism to extreme consequences.
A careful re-reading of Croce’s thought could prompt the argument
that his real concern was not so much fictions as such – types, laws,
schemata or models of natural and social science – to which he (at least)
tried to ascribe some positive function. Rather, what troubled him was
the fact that these pseudo-concepts were fixed, that is to say, hyposta-
tized, universalized or even idolized, thereby clipping the wings of free
action.
If this was so, as I believe was the case, then Croce, in his epistemo-
logical reflection, confused two kinds of problems. He started out from
the concern that the schemata, fictionally taken sub species aeternitatis,
and as a peculiar figure of the immutable, risked choking or killing life
and its flow. Yet he ended up by projecting this concern onto his reflec-
tion concerning the epistemological status of science and the models
used by science. In so doing, he failed to realize that models are only fic-
tionally taken as fixed. Should it turn out to be the case, in reality, that
the hypotheses, fictions or foundational fictions do bear the burden of
an absolute value, then this is a problem that does not specifically con-
cern the ‘nature’ or the epistemological status of fictions. Rather, it con-
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cerns the relationship between the scholar and knowledge (or the discipline),
or the relationship between knowledge and those to whom this knowledge is
transmitted or communicated.
Therefore, by projecting his concerns about his epistemological re-
flection, Croce ends up attributing negative connotations to pseudo-
concepts. Fictions are, from the very outset, assumed as pseudo-
 concepts, that is, false, fake, fictitious. Nevertheless, even that which is
presented as pure concept is and remains a fiction, a name constructed
by Croce’s discourse.
Turning now to Pareto’s discourse, it would be mistaken to disregard
that which, to my knowledge, was his last reflection on nominalism, or
rather on names and things. His thought on this subject is developed in
paragraph 118 of his Treatise (Pareto 1916). There he also seems to be
willing to reformulate the issues that had emerged in the heated
polemic on the so-called «Paretaio», as well as the contrast between «lit-
erary economists» and «mathematical economists», which had resulted
in reciprocal excommunications (and even insults) between scholars.1
Pareto’s stance, however, is not formulated in terms of opposition be-
tween these two categories of economists. Instead, he re-examines and
retraces the path of the purification of political economy towards a Pure
Economics and radicalizes his nominalism, albeit with contradictory
outcomes.
Pareto looked favorably on the process of purifying political econo-
my by freeing it from the «words of vulgar language» to the benefit of
greater precision. Such an operation was achieved, for instance, by
Jevons, who abandoned the term «value» and substituted it with «rate
of exchange». But
the literary economists did not follow him along this path, and they are still indulging
their fancy in seeking to find out the nature of value, or of capital, etc. It is impossible
to get it into their heads that things are everything and names nothing; consequently
they have the power to give the names of value and capital to whatever they please,
provided they deign to indicate them to us quite precisely, which, however, they fail
to do. If their arguments concerned experimental science, then the arguments would
still stand up once the names of value and capital were removed, because once names
have been removed, the things still remain, and it is only the latter that are the focus
1 The issue arose from the polemics between Pantaleoni and Sensini (a pupil of Pareto’s);
the dispute then became fiercer with the publication of Sensini’s (1910) book La teoria della
 rendita [The Theory of  Rent], where the author played on the polemical opposition between
 «literary economists» and «mathematical economists», arguing that Pantaleoni understood
nothing of mathematics. The clash came to a head with the article by Jannacone (1912)
 bearing the title Il paretaio, which was published in the journal of which Einaudi was the  editor-
in-chief: it was an article that accused Pareto’s followers, Sensini in particular, of aping,
 slavishly imitating or even plagiarizing their master. Pareto himself was then obliged to medi-
ate between his pupil, Sensini, and his friend Pantaleoni. On this debate see Magnani 2005,
McLure 2007 (ch. 6), Mornati 2004.
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of interest of experimental science. But since, on the other hand, these arguments are
predominantly rhetorical, they are strictly dependent on the words designed to kin-
dle feelings that help to persuade those who are listening to them. For this very rea-
son, literary economists should be extremely careful when it is a question of words,
and much less in the case of things.
(Pareto, 1916, §118, transl. mine)
In this regard Pareto added a note (note 1) where he reiterated that lit-
erary economists were aiming to engage in persuasion: it is «through
sentiment that one can persuade others» (ibidem).
According to Pareto, the mistake made by literary economists resided
in an assumption forming part of their line of reasoning, which he sum-
marizes as follows:
“there exists an unknown thing that operates on language and gives birth to the word
‘capital’. Since the vernacular language is the absolutely exact copy of  the things it represents,
by studying the word we will be able to acquire knowledge of the thing, and by in-
vestigating the nature of capital, we will understand this unknown thing”. The defect
of this justification lies in the underlined proposition, which is false.
(Ibidem)
Pareto was right to underline the falsity of the argument which holds
that a name is an «exact copy» of a thing, but he fell into an error of the
opposite type. Namely, having taken note of the unbridgeable gap be-
tween the name and the thing, he attempted to disencumber himself of
the name completely in order to possess the thing at first hand, without
mediation – «things are everything, names nothing». What Pareto over-
looked is that in order to support these arguments, he nevertheless had
to use names throughout his entire line of reasoning. In absolutizing the
«thing», he failed to take into account that the name is the sign of the
thing. He seemed to seek the death of the word, or at least to eliminate
any ambiguity of the language so as to replace it with symbols and
mathematical numbers, as he claimed to have done in the Manuale, yet
they are still signs of  the thing and not the thing in itself.
These considerations may also reflect Pareto’s negative conception
of persuasion and rhetoric and, above all, of the sentiments through
which suasive action is assumed to take effect. Pareto wished to re-
place persuasion and rhetoric with scientific arguments, yet despite his
constant assertion that he was in no way prompted by the aim of per-
suading anyone, he seemed somewhat disappointed by his inability to
«get it into the heads [of  literary economists] that things are everything and
names nothing». But how could Pareto get this argument, which was
not a «thing», «into the head» of someone who failed to understand it?
Furthermore, the example of water described shortly thereafter be-
gins, quite paradoxically, in precisely the following manner: «those
who wish to persuade themselves of this…». Why «persuade»? For
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Pareto, «scientifically […] first you pay attention to the thing, then you
try to find a name for it». This is the manner of proceeding adopted,
for instance, in chemistry to define the properties of «water». «First
you consider the body formed by the combination of oxygen and hy-
drogen, and then you search around for how to indicate it»  (ibidem).
But, once again, «oxygen» and «hydrogen» are names. «Chemistry» is
not a thing. Pareto’s very field of study, «Pure Economics», is not a
thing. And even the purity of Pure Economics cannot but be claimed
by words and names.
It has been said that Pareto tended to confuse two different planes
when expounding his ideas: the analysis of action and its representation
(Bobbio 1964, xxii). Naturally, this need not be a cause for surprise, as
it follows necessarily from the removal of language in accordance with
his belief that «things are everything and names nothing». But how
could arguments in defense of this thesis be put forward if not by words
and names?
6. An Einaudian Pre-Conclusion:
Value-Judgments, the Economist qua Economist
and the Whole Man
After the Croce-Pareto debate, only Einaudi attempted to reappraise
some of its unsettled issues, spurred by the debate with his pupil
Fasiani, who had become Paretian, and also by the debate with Croce.
For our purposes it is worth noting, not without some simplification,
that the Einaudi-Fasiani debate1 was sparked by Einaudi’s critique, in
Myths and paradoxes of  justice in taxation, of Pareto’s «indecent con-
tempt» against «literary economists» (Einaudi 1938, 257). This critique
was perceived by Fasiani as an attack on his own «scientific self»
(Fasiani’s letter to Einaudi, June 1938, in Fossati, Silvestri 2012: 72 (italics
mine)), and thus as an attack on his own identity. Accordingly, Fasiani
mounted his counter-critique of Einaudi as a «defense» of his own sci-
entific self. Furthermore, since Fasiani identified and recognized himself
in Pareto’s methodological position and in the Paretian positivist no-
tion of Science, he counterattacked Einaudi’s work by claiming that it
went beyond the boundaries of Science. It was, Fasiani argued, deeply
affected by value-judgments, counsels, projects and precepts. As we
will see, Einaudi perceived this critique as a form of «excommunica-
tion» (in the name of Science). Furthermore, in the Einaudi-Croce debate
on «Liberism and Liberalisms» (Croce, Einaudi, 1957) the separation be-
tween Philosophy and Economics reappeared, heavily aggravating
1 On this debate see Fossati and Silvestri 2013, Fossati 2014.
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their misunderstandings.1 These debates led Einaudi to write his most
engaging methodological essay, On Abstract and Historical Hypotheses
and on Value-judgments in Economic Sciences, and then to rewrite it, in an
unpublished rewriting (Einaudi 2017) whose meaning is still today to be
assessed (Silvestri 2017a, 2017b, 2017c).2
Given the complexity of this essay and of its rewriting, I will limit my-
self to showing how some parts of it may be interpreted – among the
many interpretations that may be drawn therefrom – as an attempt to
overcome some of the above-mentioned divides. The latter included
first and foremost the clash between Philosophy and Economics, and
between Economic science and value-judgments, as well as distinctions
between theory and counsels, rational and irrational, abstraction and
reality, theoretical and applied economics. Such divergences, it seems
to be suggested, should be overcome by explicitly admitting the discur-
sive (and, therefore, always ambiguous) nature, not only of Economics
or Philosophy but also of the very ‘discourse’ on method.
Einaudi addressed the issue of the origins and reasons underlying the
alleged indifference of the economist towards the ends of action and al-
so towards the choices made by the ruling class and the economic
agents. He also, and indeed above all, sought to plumb his own moral
ends, an appraisal which, in turn, prompts the question of whether the
economist qua economist may pronounce value judgments.3
First of all, Einaudi resumed his critique of Pareto and (now) took
on the task of rebutting Fasiani’s contempt for «literary economists»,
charged with «contemptuously belittling the other and perhaps better
part of themselves» (Einaudi 2017, 38). Einaudi was referring here to,
passions and sentiments, which are at the origin of any authentic re-
search (Einaudi 1941, 1942). Those who are «incapable of perceiving
the links between the two aspects of the whole person end up con-
structing insipid theory and supplying the counsels they know will
find favor with the powerful» (Einaudi 2017, 38). As we will see below,
1 I have analysed both the anthropological assumptions and the epistemological aspects of
the Croce-Einaudi debate respectively in Silvestri 2007 and Silvestri 2010a.
2 The first version of this essay is now translated in Einaudi 2014 [1942-1943]. An overview
of Einaudi’s vision and method relating to the first version of this essay is in Forte and Mar-
chionatti 2012, 593-595.
3 From an historical point of view, since economics was originally motivated by normative
concerns, the positive/normative distinction «began as a defensive move», but later «became
part of economics’ disciplinary and professional delineation» (Weston 2009, 367 (italics mine)).
For a recent reappraisal of the issue and a better analytical distinction of value judgments see
Mongin 2006. The issue of the legitimacy of Economics and the economist (in terms of exper-
tise) when dealing with the issue of value judgments is clearly grasped by Baujard 2013. Again,
John Davis (2014) has provided an interesting behavioral explanation of economists’ denial of
value judgments in terms of «loss aversion» and «economists’ social identity as economists».
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this issue of the «whole person» was developed in his rewriting of the
conclusions.
For Einaudi economists’ indifference towards the ends became pos-
sible only by considering the means-ends nexus from an ‘external’ point
of view and by fictionally putting within brackets the reign of ends.
Nevertheless,
there exists no plausible reason why scientific research should come to a halt when
beholding … the ideals and reasons of life, almost as if these were untouchable con-
cepts … If what follows likewise influences the choices that have already been made,
if the results of such choices and the choices themselves have an effect on the actual
reasons for these choices, then how can one say: this is where science starts; and be-
fore this there is … what?
(Einaudi 2017, 68)
In Einaudi’s view, the economist’s abstention from passing value judg-
ments is «legitimate» only «for reasons of the division of labor» among
disciplines and scholars. Such a division, in turn, has a «practical utility»,
yet it is nothing but merely «conventional», and in any case it does not
give any scholar the «right to excommunicate» other scholars (ibidem,
69-70, 72, 79).
In the last paragraph of the earlier version of the essay, this point
was further developed, with the added awareness that even science,
and not only legal-political dogmas,1 may turn into a form of idolatry
or dogmatism:
there exists no plausible reason for setting the boundaries of any scientific territory
according to one line rather than another: there may be someone whose curiosity is
aroused by a different range of phenomena. Thus an inquiring mind little swayed by
any urge to take up a position in this or that particular column of the table of scientific
classifications may quite legitimately study the links between ends and choices, if for
no other reason than to investigate whether by consecrating himself to a particular
science he might not be performing a sacrifice to an idol devoid of soul.
(Ibidem, 81)
In his rewriting of the conclusions, Einaudi conducts an in-depth exam-
ination, in a wider context, of the issue of the distinction between the
economist qua economist and the economist as a whole man. He thus
puts forward a critique of the Paretian (and Fasiani’s) Science/non-sci-
ence distinction, which Einaudi traces back to the anthropological-hier-
archical Rational/irrational division, and, above all, a critique of the
Crocean distinction between Philosophy and Economics, – in terms of
Reality (True) and abstraction (Useful).
1 See Einaudi 1945. On Einaudi’s awareness of the subtle threshold between dogma and
dogmatism with regard to the issue of the dogma of Sovereignty see Oddenino and Silvestri
2011, 131.
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The question arises of whether, once the economist has completed his analytical task
of highlighting that what follows from a is b and not c, so that a is an appropriate
means for obtaining the end b and inappropriate for obtaining the end c, and once he
has stripped himself of the mantle that robes the economist and has become a simple
man again, a whole man, he can justifiably pronounce moral judgments on a, b and
c. That he can – and indeed as a whole man he must – express these value judgments
is perfectly plain and there need be no discussion on this point.
(Ibidem, 83)
The true issue for Einaudi «is whether an economist, specifically as an
economist, should issue judgments on values and whether he should do
so on the basis of the tools that are proper to his discipline» (ibidem). In
other words, what is it that institutes the identity of the economist qua
economist?
If the economist qua economist identifies himself with the alleged «in-
difference», «this indifference, which is the essence of the scientist’s
garb, is the most fundamental – indeed I would say the one and only –
defense available to economists in their attempt to impede charlatans
and lackeys from bursting into their field» (ibidem, 86, italics mine). But
it is and remains a «garb» or, as Einaudi said earlier, a «mantle that robes
the economist», which can only be used rhetorically as a mere defense.
Nevertheless, Einaudi also asserts that «this science [Economics]
would cease to exist if it were to forsake reasoning with its own meth-
ods». By «method» here Einaudi simply means the unavoidable abstract
nature of Economics and economic reasoning, as compared to Croce’s
Reality. But this does not imply a form of «dualism» between philoso-
phy and economics:
since the aim of their [economists’] research is one and one alone, namely knowledge
of the full extent of the whole of reality, it is logically inconceivable to argue that
there is a fundamental, irreducible dualism between the logical position of the scien-
tist, who aspires to acquire knowledge on reality through abstractions that succes-
sively draw closer to reality, and the historian-philosopher who aims to engage with
the world of the whole of reality. Accordingly, this scenario cannot be portrayed as
a contrast, but should instead be seen as different modes of conquering truth.
(Ibidem, 88)
Moreover, «dualism cannot be founded on the contrast between the ra-
tional and the irrational» (ibidem), since the irrational is nothing but the
unknown.
In the conclusion, where Einaudi attempts to sum up the long line of
reasoning, he goes so far as to say that «even the very separation between
the whole man and man as a scientist, between reality and abstraction,
 between concrete action and pure reasoning is shown to be an abstraction»
 (ibidem, 91, italics mine).
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In contrast to the Crocean devaluation of the abstractions of sciences
as merely fictitious in the name of a true and founded Reality, Einaudi
claims that the very distinction between abstraction (science) and Real-
ity (history-philosophy) is and cannot but be an abstraction in itself,
namely a product of the language and discourse.
That Einaudi had a clear awareness of the discursive nature of Eco-
nomics and of the economist as «preacher»1 may also be understood by
re-reading his personal final balance of the history of Italian economic
thought. He abandoned the historiographical-methodological criterion
of legal-dogmatics as a criterion for writing the history of economic
dogma (or economic ideas), but he never ceased to conceive of Eco-
nomics as analogous to a legal-dogmatic construct, which is inseparable
from a certain degree of «buono e bello ragionare» [«good and fine argu-
ment»]. He added the further and later explicitly confessed awareness that
this conception of Economics may be deployed as a rhetorical device,
or a dogmatic-excommunication strategy in defence of the boundaries
of Economics, as was the case for the mode of action he adopted in the
fascist era, against charlatans and lackeys:
I speak with the knowledge that in no other neighbouring field [that stands alongside
Economics], except perhaps in that of private law of the Roman tradition, will sinners
who violate the sacred rules of good and fine argument inexorably have the anathe-
ma pronounced against them […] the heretics will not enter the temple and the
priests will continue to construct subtle and rarified theories. Better than if this were
their declared purpose, they will thus serve the good of mankind.
(Einaudi 1955 [1950], 25)
7. Concluding Remarks:
on the Identity of Disciplines and Scholars
(qua Scholars)
In order to answer the leading issues of the present paper I began by set-
ting out an interpretive framework: institutions and disciplines as dog-
matics, and the logic of scholar’s (self )legitimizing discourse. Then,
through the key concepts – dogmatics, dogma and founding Reference;
identity and legitimacy; mistaking of fiction for reality; excommunica-
tion – I re-read the methodological, ontological and epistemological dis-
courses by – and debates between – Croce, Pareto and Einaudi. Their
writings were meant to be considered as significant case studies, where
the variations on the ‘demarcation problem’ referred to the alleged sep-
aration between Philosophy, Economics and Value judgments. We
1 Well before than the famous essay by Stigler (1986), Einaudi was the first, to my knowl-
edge, to adopt the category of Preachings for the titles of three collections of essays; see, at least,
Einaudi 1920.
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have seen that scholars’ discourse takes the form of a legitimizing dis-
course regarding the founding Reference of their own discipline. This
was especially true for Croce and Pareto: their reciprocal excommuni-
cation, namely their reciprocal accusations of introducing metaphysi-
cal» assumptions, led them to a contest regarding the legitimacy of their
founding References – respectively Economic principle and Pure
 Economic. These were the References in the name of which they
spoke, and with which they identified Philosophy and Economics, the
philosopher and the economist and, therefore, themselves. Notwith-
standing their awareness of the crucial issue of nominalism versus
 realism, they ended up, contrary to their intentions, by mistaking the
fiction of their founding References for reality, thereby giving rise to a
form of dogmatism.
A final word specifically on Einaudi. His awareness of the (legal) dog-
matics of Economics – which I have integrated within the interpretive
framework – highlights the difference between being aware of such a
dogmatics versus failing to take it into consideration, as well as the con-
ventional nature of disciplinary boundaries. In this regard, even the dis-
tinction between the economist qua economist (or qua scientist) and the
economist as a whole man (or qua citizen) is the product of a scientific
discourse that institutes both the economist as such, thus qua economist,
and his (alleged) value-neutrality.
Throughout the paper we have encountered many names aiming at
founding, defending or demarcating a boundary, taken as if they were
a pure identity: the «auto-nomy» of a discipline, the economic «principle»
taken «per se», «Pure» economics, the «qua» of the scholar qua scholar,
«neutrality», «indifference». In particular, as we have seen, if they are a
pure identity, a pure unrelated, they are such only in words and through
words, for a pure unrelated does not exist. Nevertheless, they are all dis-
cursive strategies by which the thirdness of a founding Reference or
Dogma is represented and through which such a Reference gains its
own legitimacy, and scholars gain or defend their own legitimacy and
identity.
All in all, it is always the discourse, our discourse, that structures the
interaction between names and things, identities and differences, defi-
nitions and relations, thresholds and boundaries.
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